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Exiled from the Syrian political scene for thirty years, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
seized upon the chaos of the 2011 uprising as an opportunity to revive their dwindling 
political status in the country. While they have made impressive strides towards this 
goal, they were certainly not the only organization to utilize the conflict for political 
ends. Daa ' sh-the infamously barbaric Jihadi-Salafi institution-began expanding its 
operations into Syria as early as 2012. Daa'sh utilizes highly publicized brutality, which 
continues to revitalize a public dialogue on Islamism, forcing organizations like the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to grapple with a rapidly evolving political and religious 
landscape. This Islamist challenge combined with the Ikhwan's struggle to unite various 
opposition forces has muddled the rhetorical scheme of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 
Add to these challenges some burgeoning internal divisions, and the result is a 
rhetorical blunder. In this thesis, I analyze Syrian MB public statements on Daa'sh, 
focusing on the rhetorical tools they rely on to respond to the political Daa'sh poses to 
the MB's legitimacy. I conclude by suggesting alternative rhetorical tactics the Ikhwan 
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Islamism is the coalescence of Islam and political action; a vehement rejection 
of Western imperialism and a means of resisting cultural contamination. It was founded 
as a “specific social reaction to modern social and economic conditions, rapid 
urbanization, the dislocation of traditional communities and crafts, unemployment and 
anomie”1. Its means for alleviating contemporary social ills is the observation of Islam 
in all levels of society— both private and public. It is on matters relating to the latter 
component of Islamism—the observation of Islam in society—that Islamist 
organizations most frequently diverge, and it is precisely this point of disjuncture that 
has produced this research endeavor.  
One such organization is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1940 
during a wave of anti-Western sentiment which resulted from the post-Ottoman French 
Mandate. While this Islamist institution was equally critical of Western social and 
economic encroachment, they remained highly internally-oriented, concerning 
themselves with local Syrian issues. This preoccupation with establishing reform at the 
state-level, rather than the international level, has strongly affected the group’s 
developmental trajectory.  
Daaʿsh—the infamous Islamist terror group—is characterized by its 
unprecedented use of highly publicized brutality. This tactic is tailored to serve their 
end goal of not only establishing an Islamic caliphate, but also the “uprooting of shirk, 
                                                        
1 Antony, Black. The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present. New York: 






idolatry, wherever it is found”2. The destruction of shirk is a component of their 
“offensive jihad”3, or what the Daaʿshi leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi described as 
“going after the apostate unbelievers by attacking [them] in their home territory, in 
order to make God’s word most high and until there is no persecution.”4 This is the 
causative justification for the group’s brutal terror tactics.  
Daaʿsh is a very specific expression of the Jihadi-Salafi tradition. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood is widely recognized as contributing to the development of the 
Jihadi-Salafi ideology, it is very rarely categorized as such. Specifically, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is credited for championing the idea of the caliphate as being the utmost 
form of Islamist governance. While this idea is omnipresent throughout their early 
writings and political critiques, they have since then shown “a relative indifference” 
towards actually restoring the caliphate5, and have instead preoccupied themselves with 
the typical endeavors of a political party. It is worthwhile mentioning the Ikhwan’s role 
in the development of the caliphate ideology as that is the stated central goal of Daaʿsh, 
but the group’s ideological overlap ends there. Their greatest similarity—if not only—is 
their shred categorization as Islamist institutions.  
Due to their shared identity as Islamist institutions, there is therefore also a 
significant overlap in these organizations’ potential support and recruiting base within 
Syria—an overlap which has placed the Syrian Ikhwan in an awkward, quasi-diplomatic 
position. While they make it clear in their public statements that they do not condone 
                                                        
2 Cole Bunzel. "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State." The Brookings Project 
on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 19 Mar. 2015. 10. 
3 Ibid., 10. 
4 Baghdadi in Bunzel, 10. 





the violent tactics of the organization, they appear to be apprehensive to fully dismiss 
the organization on ideological grounds. As will be further delineated during the 
rhetorical analysis, this ideological apprehension appears to be fading as Daaʿsh 
increases in brutality. If the Ikhwan continue to relinquish this apprehension, they will 
be able to explicitly narrow their rhetorical audience to non-violent Sunni Muslims 
rather than all Sunni Muslims, thereby avoiding any residual ideological friction with 
Daaʿsh.  
It is for these reasons that it is worthwhile to analyze the rhetorical strategies 
which the Syrian Ikhwan have employed in their public statements on Daaʿsh, as these 
strategies illustrate the ways by which the Ikhwan are fighting to present themselves as 
a relevant and viable Islamist authority. These rhetorical strategies also grant insight 
into the group’s internal dynamics, indicating what issues may be interfering with their 
capacity to skillfully respond to Daaʿsh. The predominant rhetorical weaknesses which 
manifest throughout the Ikhwan’s statements correlate with some burgeoning 
challenges faces the Ikhwan: challenges which they must address if they hope to gain 
the support of the Syrian people. Overcoming these onerous internal challenges is a 
necessary step in stemming Daaʿsh’s expansion, as the existence of Daaʿsh and other 
extremist Islamist organizations in Syria is in part a result of the Ikhwan’s “own failure 
to present itself as a credible and attractive option to many moderate Islamists.”6 The 
group therefore cannot undermine Daaʿsh without first acknowledging their own 
failures and weaknesses.  
                                                        
6 Raphaël Lefèvre. "The Syrian Brotherhood’s Islamic State Challenge." Project on Middle East Political 






Notes on Terminology 
For some of the prominent organizations and individuals which are discussed 
throughout this text, there are multiple terms which are utilized interchangeably. For the 
“Syrian Muslim Brotherhood”, the terms “Syrian Ikhwan”, “Ikhwan” and “Syrian 
Brotherhood” are all used interchangeably. Bashar Al-Assad is referred to as “Al-
Assad”, “The Syrian Regime” or simply “The Regime”. 
The texts analyzed in this piece and words of Arabic origin for which there are 
no English equivalents have been translated in accordance with the International Journal 
of Middle East Studies Transliteration Guide7. This is with the notable exception of the 
term Daaʿsh, which is most often referred to in English by the terms ISIS (The Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham/ Syria), ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or the 
Islamic State. I have opted to make this exception as Daaʿsh is the term utilized by the 
communities which will be discussed throughout this thesis, and this term maintains 
important connotative nuances which are not present in the various English terms. 8 
  
                                                        
7 "IJMES TRANSLATION & TRANSLITERATION GUIDE." IJMES Editorial Office. International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, North Carolina State University, Department of History, 2013. Web. 
8 Acronyms are not traditionally used in Arabic, meaning that in the Arabic-speaking world, “Daaʿsh” is 
by and large considered to be a term in and of itself. This means that when the term Daaʿsh is used rather 
than ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State, it does not inherently credit the group as being either Islamic or a state, 
so the use of the term Daaʿsh can be a means to demean the organization. Further, it sounds and looks 
similar to the term Daaʿs, which means to trample or crush underfoot. Read more on this terminology 
here:  
Alice Guthrie. "Decoding Daaʿsh: Why Is the New Name for ISIS so Hard to Understand?" Free Word: 






Chapter One: Historical Background 
Origins 
Events which unfolded in the late 19th century Ottoman Syria helped craft the 
social, political and economic conditions which were favorable to the founding of an 
organization like the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In the early nineteenth century, the 
Damascene ʿulamaʾ maintained a high social status which “depended on the value 
attached to religious knowledge”9. The status of these religious leaders was naturally 
affected by a series of political and economic developments in the period of 1839-1876, 
which “helped raise the status of non-Muslims”10, simultaneously diminishing the social 
value previously assigned to the ʿulamaʾ. These developments were put forth in the 
Ottoman Tanzimat—a series of reforms, which aimed to introduce some components of 
Enlightenment reform such as “individual rights, respect for private property and the 
market economy”11—traits which were all viewed as distinctly European. This invasion 
of foreign thought created the perfect conditions for an Islamic movement.  
This movement had roots dating back to 19th century when the Salifiyya 
movement reached Dasmascus. Salafism “reconciled current ideas about reason, 
science, and progress with religion to disprove an assumption embedded in the 
Tanzimat and later Ottoman reforms, namely that the ʿulamaʾ lacked the knowledge and 
skills necessary to guide the empire to prosperity”12. Simultaneously, this movement 
                                                        
9  David Dean Commins. Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1990. 9.  
10 Ibid., 9. 
11 Christian C. Sahner. Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present. New York: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. 
Syria. Damascus: 1953. Print, 89. 





was also a reaction to the perceived threat of cultural invasion, as it “sought to reform 
Islam from within in order to give the Arab world the resources deemed necessary to 
confront the challenges of European domination”13. 
The end of World War I marked the beginning of the French Mandate of 
Syria—a title which many Syrians saw as nothing more than a euphemism for “foreign 
despotism”14. The presence of a foreign ruler revitalized the fervor of an already 
blossoming political Islamic movement, which would thereafter gain broader support 
via its appeal to the notion of nationalism. Another factor supporting the general tone of 
civil unrest were the rapidly evolving economic conditions during the French Mandate 
period. Mandate authorities eagerly welcomed foreign trade, which naturally harmed 
“small urban traders and local artisans”15. This influx of trade benefitted only a few 
successful merchants, further strengthening the class tensions which had been sparked 
during the Ottoman period. These economic and social conditions strengthened civil 
discontent, fostering the growth of a social resistance movement.  
One expression of ideological resistance to this invasion of foreign thought took 
the form of Islamic organizations, or jamiʿat—“societies and clubs dedicated to the 
promotion of intellectual or political goals”16. These societies originated in Syria during 
Ottoman rule and would ultimately serve as the structure through which Islamism 
would later take a political form. One jamiʿa specifically—the Shabab Mohammed—is 
widely regarded as being the predecessor the Syrian Ikhwan. Throughout the nineteen 
                                                        
13  Raphaël Lefèvre. Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 10. 
14 Sahner, Among the Ruins, 100. 
15 Lefèvre, Ashes, 11. 





twenties and thirties, groups like the Shabab Mohammed organized to resist the French 
authorities’ efforts to impose western cultural norms, such as the unveiling of women.  
The mandate period created a set of conditions that naturally set the stage for 
political and economic discontent. In addition to imposing French social norms, the 
mandate government failed to make any changes to the existing power structure which 
favored the landlord-merchant class17. Thus, members of the political periphery were 
being oppressed by both local and foreign interests. With the addition of a shortage of 
basic commodities, it is no wonder that the jamiʿat were well-received by a discontent 
population.  
The Syrian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood would not be officially chartered 
until 1945 following the return of Mustapha al- Sibaʿi —a young Syrian from Homs—
from Cairo where he had studied with the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hassan al-Banna. Although the Syrian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood would 
rapidly establish its own brand of the organization, it seemed to adopt the Egyptian 
Ikhwan’s primary aim of “becoming both the explicit extension of the local religious 
clubs, or jamiʿat, and the intellectual heir of the Salifiyya movement”18. When al-Sibaʿi 
returned to Syria with another Syrian native, Mohammed al-Hamid, the two strove to 
unify the various jamiʿat into a cohesive Islamist organization, which would ultimately 
form the Syrian Ikhwan. Upon Syria’s independence from France in 1946, the Ikhwan 
moved immediately to become a political force by running in the first parliamentary 
elections.  
                                                        
17 Samer Abboud. Syria. Polity, 2016. 17-21.  





 From the outset, the group was distinctly pragmatic. While they advocated for 
Islam to be the official state religion, they were also careful to note that they had no 
intention of creating a theocracy. Mustapha al-Sibaʿi’s draft constitution, which he 
presented to the Constituent Assembly, stated in its third article: “Islam is the state 
religion; other divine religions and religious minorities will be respected”19. This 
provision was not warmly received by the assembly, and Sibaʿi eventually agreed to a 
provision that instead required the head of state to be a Muslim and for “fiqh—Islamic 
Jurisprudence” to be the root source of law.20 The Brotherhood’s practice of 
pragmatism would at times earn them criticism from constituents who viewed them as 
sacrificing religion for political gain.  
 The early Syrian Brotherhood was also strongly socialist in outlook, as is 
illustrated by al-Sibaʿi’s doctrine of “Islamic socialism”21. Al- Sibaʿi underscored the 
ways by which Islam and socialism shared some fundamental values, such as social 
equality and the elimination of poverty. These were favorable positions to hold at a time 
when many potential constituents—the disgruntled members of the lower middle 
class—were maintaining an increasingly revolutionary outlook.  
While the Salafiyya movement put forth the ideological basis of the Syrian 
Ikhwan, it is important to note that the group’s formation was just as equally a result of 
the political and economic realities of the time. This close relationship with local 
conditions is an important attribute of the overall institutional structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, while all adhering to a specific 
                                                        
19 Sibai in Lefèvre, Ashes, 31.  
20 Ibid.,31.  





ideological tradition, “they operate independently and in response to local 
conditions”. 22 Accordingly, each chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood is geared towards 
achieving a revolution at the national scale, rather than having any international 
aspirations.  It is therefore natural that such an internally-oriented organization would 
only be born in response local conditions.  
The Ikhwan and the Baʿth 
The Baʿth Party was founded in the late nineteen 1930’s during the same period 
of nationalist fervor which had helped the Ikhwan rise to prominence. The two groups, 
while often disagreeing on matters relating to the degree of Islam in the government, 
did not have notable clashes during this early period. Baʿth ideology maintained a high 
degree of socialism, which was well-received at a time when the public was leaning 
increasingly towards the left. The Baʿth party also put forth a heavily nationalist 
rhetoric, which earned them the support of various minority groups in Syria who had 
become increasingly ostracized by the Sunni majority. 23  
 One such minority group which would eventually rise to power within the Baʿth 
party was the ʿAlawiyya. The ʿAlawiyya “practice a small and poorly understood form 
of Shiʿism”24 which incorporates features of Ismaʿilism and Christianity. The ʿAlawi 
community has historically been concentrated in Latakia, where they have been subject 
to Sunni landowners. Many Sunnis do not consider the ʿAlawiyya to be Muslims at all, 
                                                        
22 Robert G. Rabil. "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." In The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization 
and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement. Edited by Barry Rubin, 73-88. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010. 
23 John Galvani. “Syria and the Baʿth Party”. MERIP Reports 25, 1974. 5.  





and they have therefore experienced a long history of discrimination in the 
predominantly Sunni country.  
 The Baʿth party and the Ikhwan both aimed to gain the support of the same 
group—“the educated and nationalist lower and middle classes”25. Thus, the Ikhwan’s 
decision to opt out of the 1954 elections played directly into the hands of the Baʿth. The 
Ikhwan’s move to minimize its political role in Syria was likely in response to tense 
conditions in Egypt, where the Nasser regime was carrying out a campaign of 
repression against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.26 After this sabbatical from 
politics, the Syrian Ikhwan struggled to compete with the increasingly popular Baʿth 
party.  
The Baʿth party owes much of the credit for its successful 1963 coup to the 
French authorities’ ruling practices during the mandate. In order to maintain control, the 
“the French military recruitment had focused heavily on the dissident rural 
communities, which the French considered to be less nationalist than the urban 
Sunni”27. Accordingly, the ʿAlawiyya and other pro-Baʿth groups were 
disproportionately represented in the military. Further, due to their lower socioeconomic 
standing, such groups were often unable to pay the “badal” or financial substitute which 
would allow them to opt out of military service.28 The ʿAlawis in the military 
constituted a relatively cohesive bloc, allowing them to rise in rank over the often 
divided Sunni officers.  
                                                        
25 Lefèvre, Ashes, 38. 
26 Ibid., 39. 
27Galvani. “Syria and the Baath Party”. 5. 





 In 1954, the Baʿth party won twenty-two seats in the parliamentary elections, 
making it clear that they were a viable political threat to the Ikhwan. Further, popular 
support for Nasser was growing in Syria during the same time that Nasser was leading a 
campaign to sabotage the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Ikhwan were appearing 
increasingly out of sync with the Syrian population that was backing the secular, 
nationalist and socialist parties.29 
In 1958, Syria entered into a union with Egypt and formed the United Arab 
Republic under the leadership of Nasser, who demanded the dissolution of all political 
parties. It was during this time that “a core group of Syrian ʿAlawi officers based in 
Cairo became involved in the establishment of the Baʿth’s secret Military 
Committee”30—a discreet unit which played a leading role in the 1963 military coup 
which put the Baʿth party in power. In the years following, the ʿAlawiyya moved 
quickly to solidify their power within the party, leading to the 1970 installation of Hafez 
al-Assad as Syrian President.  
 Tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Assad regime arose quickly.  
Although Assad at first made intentional efforts to overcome the Baʿthist sectarian past 
by appointing many Sunnis to government positions, he still disproportionately 
funneled resources to the ʿAlwai community. Moreover, his identity as an ʿAlawi was 
enough in itself to lead the Ikhwan to speak out against the regime. Saʿid Hawwa, the 
chief ideologue of the Ikhwan, started referencing “Ibn Tamiyya’s fatwa against the 
                                                        
29 Rabil. "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood". 73-88.  





minority community”31. By doing so, the Ikhwan and other Islamic groups hoped to 
frame the regime as anti-Islamic and inspire popular support for their efforts. 
 The period of 1979-1982 was marked by an increase in violent uprisings against 
the regime— a period which breeds some confusion for those who study the activities 
of the Syrian Ikhwan. A campaign of assassinations was launched against members of 
the regime by the Fighting Vanguard—a jihadist organization that had loose 
connections to the Syrian Ikhwan. Since its inception, the Ikhwan had adopted a non-
violent approach to achieving its political goals. During this time, however, many of the 
individuals carrying out acts of violence were in one way or another connected to the 
Ikhwan. “If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the 
organization to do so”32, write Leiken and Brooke, discussing the Brothers general 
success in sifting out radicalism. However, the Ikhwan’s mere association with these 
radical movements was enough to make them a target of the regime. Further, the issue 
of abstaining from or utilizing violence became an increasingly controversial topic 
within the Ikhwan’s. To this day, the issue of violence remains a tense topic within the 
group.  
 By 1979, “state repression had become such that the Ikhwani leadership decided 
it was time to respond to Baʿthist provocations by raising the banner of jihad itself”33. 
They staged violent uprisings Syrian cities, and members of the Ikhwan in concert with 
the Fighting Vanguard “stormed the Aleppo Artillery Academy and murdered dozens of 
                                                        
31 Lefèvre, Ashes, 73. 
32 Robert S Leiken and Steven Brooke. "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood." Foreign Affairs 86.2 
(2007): 107- 121. EBSCOhost, 5. 





Alawi officers.”34 In 1980, after narrowly escaping an assassination attempt, Assad 
issued Law 49, declaring membership in the Muslim Brotherhood to be punishable by 
death. The Brothers continued to stage attacks, believing that it would help them to earn 
popular support in Syria.  
In February 1982, the Brothers allied with the Jihadi Fighting Vanguard and led 
an uprising which failed so miserably that it still serves as a demerit on the reputation of 
the Ikhwan. When the rebellion began in Hama, the regime responded ruthlessly, killing 
20,000-40,000 Syrians35 and shelling whole quarters of the city. The Ikhwan’s role in 
this attack and their following exile left them grappling for relevance in their home 
country.  
A “Crisis of Irrelevance”: The Ikhwan 1982- 2011 
The brutal events in Hama in 1982 reinforced the longstanding sectarian divisions 
within the group that had been inhibiting its capacity to act as a cohesive unit. The most 
prominent division within the group lie between the “Aleppo clan” and the “Hama 
clan”. The Aleppo clan was “more cautious to not provoke the regime into a last-ditch 
battle before the Ikhwan were certain they had chances of winning it”36. This faction of 
the Ikhwan attempted to slow the process of radicalization leading up to the massacre of 
1982, but eventually was overwhelmed by the Hama clan. The Hama clan was 
composed of younger activists who often advocated for more radical means. Though the 
Ikhwan did not resort to violence until late 1979, the Hama clan—who controlled the 
group throughout the seventies—had been fostering the notion of Islamic militancy 
                                                        
34 Rabil, "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." 75.  
35 Lefèvre, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: A 'centrist' jihad?” Turkish Review, 4(2) (2014). 11. 





through the decade previous. Naturally, the bloody failure of 1982 incited mud-slinging 
between the two factions, who predominantly took up their exiles in separate states—
the Allepines in Jordan and the Hamawites in Iraq, where they resumed Jihadi military 
training.37 To this day, the animosity between the Aleppo and Hama clans continues to 
foster impractical sectarian divisions within the group.  
The future of the group looked grim: “…the organization had been left for 
decades with neither a base inside the country nor the credibility it once enjoyed”38. The 
group attempted to launch a war of propaganda against the regime using its publication 
al-Nadhir, which utilized tactics such as comparing Assad to the Zionists to undermine 
his reputation. Meanwhile, the regime—seizing upon the Ikhwan’s ensuing crisis of 
identity—instigated conciliatory measures with the more moderate members of the 
brotherhood. These meetings, which didn’t lead to any resolution between the regime 
and the Ikhwan, did indeed bring about the intended result of amplifying tensions within 
the Brotherhood.39 
In exile, the Ikhwan continued to try and insert themselves into the events 
unfolding in Syria. After Bashar al-Assad took over the position of president in 2000, 
Syrian intellectuals published a petition of their desired governmental reforms, which 
became a widely supported initiative. This ushered in the “Damascus Spring”—a civil 
society movement which culminated in the signing of the Damascus Declaration in 
2005.40 This declaration, which was crafted by an opposition coalition, called for “a 
gradual and peaceful transition to democracy and the equality of all citizens in a secular 
                                                        
37 Lefèvre, Ashes, 141. 
38 Ibid., 161. 
39 Rabil, "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.", 79. 





and sovereign Syria.”41  It was a milestone in the development of a Syrian opposition 
force, as the regime had successfully repressed all but one anti-regime political 
organizations; the Syrian Ikhwan42.  
For the first time in decades, the Ikhwan were involved in a Syrian opposition 
movement, which rightfully made some coalition members concerned about regime 
retaliation. In May of that year, the regime began a rigorous clampdown on the 
movement, once again reminding the Syrians to avoid the Ikhwan. Although the 
collaboration with the Ikhwan certainly strengthened the resolve of the regime, this was 
not the only reason for the end of the Damascus Spring. Despite the relative success of 
the Damascus Spring, “the Declaration signatories were never able to translate that 
cooperation into sustained pressure against the regime”43, which was actively working 
to repress the movement.  
The Ikhwan left the coalition of the Damascus Declaration in 2006, when they 
formed a Saudi-backed opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front, with the 
defected former Syrian vice president, Abdel Halim Khaddam.44 However, this 
coalition received very little support within Syria and in fact had the effect of harming 
the Brothers’ image, as they had allied with a former pillar of the Assad regime.  
In exile, the Ikhwan continued to struggle with the role of Islam in their vision 
for Syria. In 2004, they published “The Political Project for the Future Syria.”, which 
enshrined Islam as the official state religion, and also included protections for 
democracy and other historically western values. The following year, a Syrian 
                                                        
41 "The Damascus Declaration." Carnegie Middle East Center.  
42 Abboud, Syria, 51. 
43Ibid., 53. 





expatriate named Wafa Sultan articulated the disdain which many Syrians had begun to 
feel towards the Ikhwan:  
Do they have the courage to openly declare their new beliefs and 
apologize for their past so that we won’t need to dig up their past? They 
are calling [now] for a pluralistic, democratic society ruled by the 
principles of justice and equality. On what basis are they going to build 
this society?...Have they changed their fundamental beliefs? Why don’t 
they give an answer to this question?...They used to commit crimes [and 
then] escape to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Jordan [in order to find] a safe 
haven, and now they are planning to return from these safe havens to the 
scene of their crimes to participate in building a democratic, pluralistic 
society based on justice and equality?!45  
As exemplified in this passage, the Ikhwan were becoming less outwardly religious as 
the Syrian population was becoming increasingly devout46, exacerbating their struggle 
to maintain relevance from abroad.   
The Ikhwan, the Syrian Conflict and Daaʿsh  
Regardless of their various defeats, Raphaël Lefèvre asserts that the 2011 Arab 
spring and the events following offered a golden opportunity to the Brotherhood: 
…if their presence inside Syria was indeed limited, their ideological 
influence, history of unyielding opposition to the Baʿth, significant 
financial resources and organizational capacities would nonetheless 
make them an essential future component of any post-Assad 
settlement.47 
Members of the blossoming opposition came to terms with this realization and invited 
the Ikhwan to the meeting which established the Syrian National Council in October 
2011. They were not necessarily warmly welcome at first, as their various failures had 
                                                        
45 Yvette Talhamy. “The Syrian Uprising: The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn.” Middle East 
Quarterly, 19(2) (2012), 35. 
46 Ibid. 35 





yet to fall from memory. "Those 30 years destroyed their organization,”48 said Burhan 
Ghalioun, the first head of the Syrian National Council. “They lost their legitimacy 
because they changed positions so much without explanation over the past five years.”49 
While the lingering distrust was palpable, so too were the potential advantages of 
allying with the Ikhwan, who had considerable resources to offer to the cause.  
The Brotherhood became a leading member of this council and has utilized this 
role to help “reactivate their long-dormant networks throughout the country”50. They 
use these networks to help disperse much needed aid throughout the region, as very few 
outside humanitarian institutions enjoy the same broad reach and organization of the 
Ikhwan. Simultaneously, they continue denounce violence and maintains a moderate 
stance, rarely referencing Islam in its frameworks for a post-Assad Syria. In an attempt 
to have as broad an appeal as possible within Syria, it appears to some that the 
Brotherhood has prioritized nationalism over Islam. 
While the rapidly unfolding conflict produced a power vacuum in Syria, the 
Ikhwan’s ambiguous accord with Islam simultaneously established an Islamist vacuum. 
These two conundrums were exacerbated by the opposition’s failure to establish a 
unified military force. The first opposition military force—the Free Syrian Army—
attempted to unite the various rebel entities, but ultimately failed to centralize its 
leadership and military strategy. 51 So, too, did the Joint Command for the Revolution’s 
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Military Council, and as this coalition began to fragment, “alternative networks of 
violence began to emerge”52. 
 It is within this chaotic context that Daaʿsh first entered the Syrian scene. Just 
as they had done in Iraq, Daaʿsh moved to “exploit existing political chaos and sectarian 
violence”53 in Syria by founding a jihadi brigade under the leadership of Mohammed al-
Jolani. The entity worked under the title Jabat al-Nusra until April 2013 when Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi—the leader of Daaʿsh—stated in an online audio message: “It’s now time 
to declare in front of the people of the Levant and world that the al Nusrah Front is but 
an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it”54. A separate, al-Qaʿida 
sponsored al-Nusra still operates under the leadership of Jolani, though many militants 
defected to Daaʿsh during the ensuing split. After the announcement of a Daaʿshi 
presence, the group worked swiftly to expand their territorial holdings, and by 2014 
“controlled large swathes of Syrian and Iraqi territory stretching from Anbar in Iraq to 
the regions immediately east of Aleppo in Syria”55.  
In May of that same year, Daaʿsh launched its online campaign, utilizing social 
media platforms to recruit militants and to terrify its potential enemies. Their initial 
videos and various online productions were very low quality, but with the assistance of 
a team of highly-skilled professionals, the group’s online presence quickly reached 
unprecedented quality levels for an organization of this nature.56 Though it may seem to 
conflict with the group’s otherwise seventh-century ideologies, technology—with its 
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capacity to establish a brand and disseminate information—has lent itself quite 
favorably to the Daaʿshi cause.  
Daaʿsh and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood have the potential to appeal to 
similar audiences, but in very different ways. Both view Islam as the remedy for present 
social ills and advocate for the observation of Muslim values at the state level. While 
their means for establishing this end are greatly dissimilar, this fundamental similarity 






Chapter Two: Rhetorical Analysis 
Methods & Justification 
Daaʿsh’s unprecedented success is organizing in Iraq and Syria has posed a 
serious conundrum for other Islamist authorities. These organizations have had to 
reorient themselves on the spectrum Islamism as Daaʿsh has pushed the conservative, 
extremist end of the spectrum into uncharted territories.  This is in part due to the fact 
that Daaʿsh has created its own “brand of Salafi Jihadism”57 which maintains 
components of the traditional Jihadi-Salafi brand, but has added a stronger form of 
“offensive jihad”58. Thus, other Islamist organizations—such as the Syrian Ikhwan—
can appear bland and outdated when compared to a tech-savvy group that is actively 
and violently pursuing their stated goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.  
 The relationship of Daaʿsh to Al-Qaʿida—while being beyond the scope of this 
research—is a worthwhile example of how Daaʿsh has posed a challenge to other 
Islamist organizations. Daaʿsh’s Iraqi chapter was founded by leading members of Al-
Qaʿida, but the groups have since then taken separate paths. In the ensuing split, the 
older, loyal members of the Jihadi-Salafi community have generally given their support 
to Al-Qaʿida:  
The most prominent jihadi scholars, despite their own Salafi rigor, have 
tended to side with al-Qaʿida over the Islamic State in the developing 
feud between the two groups. This is partly due to their loyalty to al-
Qaʿida and its senior leadership. Pro al-Qaʿida jihadi scholars also object 
to the Islamic State’s inclination toward extreme and arbitrary violence, 
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including gruesome beheadings, and its perceived excess in the practice 
of takfir, or declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers.59 
Although this loyalty has helped Al-Qaʿida maintain the support of the older Salafi 
generation, Al-Qaʿida has failed to bolster such a sense of loyalty among the younger 
generation with a proclivity for Salafi-Jijadism. This failure to bridge a blossoming 
generational gap has also been a major challenge for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 
and is perhaps the greatest advantage which Daaʿsh maintains over traditional Islamist 
authorities.  
For these reasons, it is warranted to research the effects of Daaʿsh’s newfound 
popularity upon the spectrum of Islamism, as other Islamist groups have had to find 
new ways to portray themselves as a viable Islamist authority. There is no single Salafi 
authority, creating a need to identify subunits within this category which can constitute 
a manageable unit of research. The Muslim Brotherhood, as a whole, has historically 
been labeled as a Jihadi-Salafi organization, although some may dispute this 
categorization. Indeed, most contemporary Jihadi-Salafists no longer recognize the 
ideology of the Brotherhood as a variety of their own ideology, but it is nevertheless 
recognized by scholars as a milestone in the development of the ideology of Jihadism. 
Cole Bunzel, a Ph.D. candidate of Princeton who has extensively written on jihadi 
ideology, identifies the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the two primary 
components of Daaʿsh’s unique form of Salafi- Jihadism. While noting that “the 
Muslim Brotherhood has never been as doctrinally rigorous as present-day jihadis,”60 
Bunzel also asserts that “the Muslim Brotherhood’s emphasis on the caliphate is 
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particularly significant, as the earliest jihadi ideologues and groups emerged as radical 
splinters from the Brotherhood”61. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood bears a strong 
relevance in a discussion on Daaʿsh.  
To discuss the response to Daaʿsh of the entire Muslim Brotherhood would 
indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of the organization of the group. Each chapter 
of the Muslim Brotherhood is highly internally oriented: the groups have evolved in 
response to local conditions and therefore take on very different characteristics. This 
lies in contrast to the external orientation of other Islamist organizations, such as al-
Qaʿida, which aim to combat a “far-enemy” —western countries and influence—rather 
than the “near enemy” of the Ikhwan—corrupt local governments62. Thus, rather than 
constituting an international organization, the Muslim Brotherhood is instead a coalition 
of vaguely similar groups which maintain little to no coordination. With this internal 
orientation of the group taken into account, it is easy to opt for an analysis at the scale 
of one single chapter. The Syrian Ikhwan are the natural choice considering that the 
civil war has served as a fertile soil for the expansion of Daaʿsh, who have eagerly 
seized upon the state of chaos to grow their organization.  
The texts analyzed in this piece have been translated from their original Arabic 
form into English. The Ikhwan do publish some articles in English on the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s English website, but considering the stated goals of this research 
project—to analyze how the Syrian Ikhwan are attempting to sustain and reinforce their 
support base—utilizing the texts written in the language of the majority of their 
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potential supporters is the logical option. The posts published in English are clearly 
oriented towards a Western audience as they most often address issues relating to terror 
attacks in the West or Western controversies, while the Arabic posts comment more 
often on local issues. Leiken and Brooke, discussing the discrepancies between the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s English and Arabic publications, note that , “Islamists have been 
accused of using deceptive “double discourse”: good moderate cop in English, bad 
fundamentalist cop in Arabic”63. While it appears that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
may coordinate between their English and Arabic posts more than the organization at 
large, the Arabic posts are nonetheless more relevant to this research inquiry.  
The texts which were selected for analysis all originated in the sites category 
“Bayaan wa Tasriaat”, or “Announcements and Commentary”. These are formal 
statements made on the behalf of the organization, commenting on a range of recent 
events. The specific texts selected either comment on a specific act of terror carried out 
by the group or utilize a discussion of other current events to critique Daaʿsh and 
contrast it with the Syrian Ikhwan. Although Daaʿsh had a presence in Syria as early as 
2011, the group did not mention Daaʿsh by name in a public comment until January 11th 
2014, so the process of text selection was aided by a relatively short period of 
discussion. The texts are discussed in chronological order.  
Discussion of Audience  
As previously discussed, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood—like all chapters of 
the Ikhwan—is an internally-oriented organization that aims to achieve reform on a 
                                                        






local scale. Accordingly, it is logical that the group’s public statements would be geared 
towards persuading other Syrians to support their efforts, enabling them to eventually 
become a leading force in the country. In 2012, the group appeared to be confident in 
their capacity to gain political support in a post-Assad Syria, estimating that they might 
gain as much as 25% of the vote in post-conflict elections.64 However, this estimate was 
made before it had become evident that Daaʿsh was in fact rising to be a viable political 
contender. This necessitated that thereafter, the group would not only need to convey to 
Syrians that they were a viable political entity, but also that they were preferable to 
Daaʿsh. In either scenario, their intended audience is clear: in order to continue 
marching towards their goal of gaining post-conflict political power in Syria, they 
would need to capture the hearts and minds of the Syrian population. 
 That is not to say that the Syrian Ikhwan are writing to impress their Syrian 
constituents alone. It is important to note that the Syrian Ikhwan are strongly beholden 
to their donors, though the intricacies of their finances are hard to ascertain as the group 
intentionally obscures this information in order to protect their donors. This 
apprehension surrounding financial transparency stems from the group’s history of 
hostilities in Egypt, where donors to the Muslim Brotherhood have been convicted of 
“funding a banned organization”65 and even charged with thereby supporting a terrorist 
organization. While it is difficult to definitely conclude what political alliances may be 
influencing the group’s public statements, it is necessary to acknowledge that some 
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political biases may at times affect the rhetorical trajectory of the group’s public 
statements.   
While it is impossible to know the precise composition of the Syrian Ikhwan’s 
online audience, there are some notable indicators that speak to the group’s intended 
audience. First, the fact that the pieces are written in Arabic indicates that they aim to 
connect with native Arabic speakers rather than Western audiences, who would instead 
be directed to the group’s English statements. Second, the content of the statements is 
geared towards individuals who are highly familiar with the history of Syria and 
specific events occurring in the conflict and the Ikhwan’s history. They often reference 
these specific events without giving context, implying that they assume their audience 
had extensive prior knowledge. Had these statements been geared for a non-Syrian 
audience, one can assume they would divulge more details as they frequently do in 
statements published on their English website.  
Perhaps most importantly, their long-term political goals for the country, as 
outlined in their 2012 document The Muslim Brotherhood’s Vision of the Future 66, 
necessitate that they garner enough local political support to succeed in the post-Assad 
parliamentary elections. This document includes their Covenant and Pact, which 
outlines their specific vision for a post Assad Syria, calling for “a republican 
parliamentary system with representatives and officials elected in free, fair, and 
transparent elections”67, among other things. As an organization advocating for such a 
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system of free and fair of elections, their political survival is contingent upon their 
capacity to mobilize public support.   
Although their statements are primarily tailored to an audience of Syrians, this 
does not mean that they write for Syrians alone. As is explained in the following 
section, the Ikhwan frequently address the international community, condemning them 
for their failure to intervene in Syria. While I identify this primarily as a rhetorical tool 
utilized to drum up support among Syrians, I have no doubt that this is a genuine 
statement. That being said, I do not identify the international community as a primary 
audience for the Ikhwan in these statements, as their English statements are far more 
explicitly addressed to the international community.  
Predominant Rhetorical Strategies 
As will be exemplified in the following section, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood utilizes 
three primary rhetorical strategies which are summarized below.   
Daaʿsh-Assad Parallel 
The first—and perhaps most prevalent strategy—that the group uses to set 
themselves apart from Daaʿsh is likening Daaʿsh to the Assad regime and vice 
versa. This is not to say that the group only speaks hatefully of the Assad regime 
as a counter-strategy to Daaʿsh—their hostility towards Assad is perfectly robust 
on its own. However, they have recognized the widespread distaste for the 
Assad Regime and utilize this sentiment to build their argument against Daaʿsh. 
Further, the group makes it evident that they wholeheartedly believe that Assad 





only had the ability to expand in the context of the Syrian instability which was 
caused by Assad’s brutal quelling of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. This 
strategy also seems to offer them yet another opportunity to disparage the Assad 
Regime; a recurrent theme throughout all of their public comments and 
statements.  
Negligence of the International Community  
Another rhetorical strategy is a condemnation of the international community for 
its failure to recognize and address the crises occurring within Syria. This is 
often coupled with a statement on a Western terror attack, such as the Paris 
attacks of November 2015. These pieces tend to begin with a condolence, 
followed by an abrupt shift to likening those atrocities to the daily suffering of 
Syrians. By illustrating the similarities between foreign terror attacks and the 
Syrian civil war, the group is attempting to highlight the hypocrisy of the 
international community which was slow to condemn the actions of Assad. This 
is a useful tool for connecting with a community of people presently living in 
diaspora and struggling to find willing hosts among the European countries. 
Thus, by highlighting this hypocrisy, the group connects with a sentiment which 
remains very vivid for the Syrian community at home and abroad.  
Ihkwan as Salvation  
The final rhetorical strategy is a depiction of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as 
Syria’s salvation, and this strategy is utilized throughout the majority of the 





the Syrian people in an attempt to portray themselves as the best (if not only) 
option for a post-Assad Syria. They have crafted a revisionist account of their 
history in Syria, portraying their political past—preceding their period of 
exile—as being a bit more successful than it truly was. Thus, they frequently 
cite these “glory days” as evidence that they are the best political option for 
Syria.  
This “salvation” category is reinforced by the group’s scarce Qur’anic 
references, which appear far less often than one might anticipate. Despite their 
infrequent use, the appeals to Islam are still a powerful rhetorical tool, especially 
considering that the Ikhwan and Daaʿsh have developed from the same 
ideological foundation. The group’s shared ideological roots have complicated 
the Ikhwan’s rhetorical battleground, and this challenge will be explored further 
throughout the analysis.  
Analysis 
The first online publication in which the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood mentioned 
Daaʿsh by name was titled Hashemi: Assad Regime Defends “Daaʿsh” Valiantly…and 
the Syrian Revolution Will Come Out of This Ordeal, and was published on January 
11th, 2014. The author, Hassan Hashemi, was the president of the Syrian Brotherhood’s 
political bureau at the time and presently serves as “the head opposition political and 
diplomatic department in the United States and Canada”.68 As a prominent opposition 
leader and a well-respected member of the Syrian Ikhwan, he is one of the few authors 
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who publishes Tasreeat on the behalf of the organization. His text incorporates features 
of all three previously described rhetorical schemes, which indicates a firm grasp of the 
public branding of the organization.  
In this piece, Hashemi claims that a military maneuver carried out by Daaʿsh 
was sustained with the support of Assad’s troops, who defended an exit passageway, 
thereby enabling them to escape from the Syrian Free Army. While there does not 
appear to be any additional confirmation of the regime’s involvement in this clash, the 
intent is clear: the Ikhwan are attempting to highlight the interconnectedness of the 
regime and Daaʿsh. The use of the Daaʿsh-Regime parallel is a prominent rhetorical tool 
in Hashemi’s piece: in the third paragraph, he writes that “the Assad regime is one of 
the bases of terrorism. Terrorism is undertaken today with [the regime’s] support, and it 
is managed and financed by the help of his masters in Iran and Moscow.”69 Hashemi 
makes it clear that he does not only consider Assad to be partially responsible for the 
existence of Daaʿsh; rather, he sees the regime as being complicit in the atrocities of 
Daaʿsh.   
This statement illustrates a recurring point of weakness in the group’s rhetorical 
strategy. On the one hand, the linkage of Assad to the growth of terrorism is 
compelling, as one can easily argue that his military actions did help to create a chaotic 
environment within which Daaʿsh expanded. However, the Ikhwan frequently reference 
a material relationship between the regime and Daaʿsh which they have not provided 
additional evidence to support. Perhaps it is a widely held belief among their 
audience—the Syrian community at large—that Assad has contributed to the growth of 
                                                        





the group with actual material support. If this is in fact a widely held belief, than this 
line of argument would not constitute a rhetorical weakness. However, it does appear on 
its face to be an evidentially unsupported statement that is intended to strengthen the 
already tenacious sense of distrust towards the regime.  
In the following paragraph, Hashemi continues to emphasize the Daaʿsh-Regime 
parallel, while simultaneously engaging the strategy of “Ikhwan as Salvation”: 
Hashemi stressed that the Syrian revolution is solely concerned with 
rejecting the terrorism which the regime planted in a dust which nothing 
is able to grow in it. And he added “while Daaʿsh and the regime 
continue the wasting of the blood of innocent people with a brutality and 
a savagery which the world has never seen before, the pious sons of the 
revolution deal with the situation with the morals of Islam. The devout 
Muslim will maintain focus on a concern for the blood of the 
innocents” 70 
This portion once again emphasizes the interconnectedness of the regime and Daaʿsh by 
not only stating that the regime is responsible for its creation, but also by lumping the 
two into the same category as the killers of innocents. The juxtaposition of a 
condemnation of Daaʿsh and the regime with an immediate portrayal of the “pious sons 
of the revolution” as heroes serves to reinforce the group’s image as the liberators of the 
Syrian people. They further utilize this opportunity to appeal to a higher authority by 
referencing the “morals of Islam”; a maneuver which portrays their cause as being 
ordained by Allah. This passage exemplifies the Ikhwan’s very intentional attempt to 
craft their public image.  
 Hashemi, who is clearly well-versed in the Syrian Ikhwan’s standards of 
rhetoric, concludes his comments with a condemnation of the international community: 
                                                        





“He concluded by directing a message to the international community 
which has been silent about the heinous crimes of the Assad regime, 
demanding that they stop supporting this murderer of his people, and 
cease their silence towards his crimes, and leave the Syrian people to 
regain their dignity and liberate their freedom of decision” 71 
This condemnation of the silence of the international community serves not only as a 
call to action for international actors, but also evokes a commonly shared notion that the 
silence of the international community has served as its implicit approval of the actions 
of the regime. In October of 2015, this sentiment was echoed by a group of “Syrian civil 
society organisations and actors”72 who published a statement calling on the 
international community to stop ignoring the suffering of the Syrians. Their statement 
concluded with: 
Our cries have fallen on deaf ears for far too long, and the list of our dead continues to 
grow. While our faith in the international community has all but disappeared, we 
continue to speak out for the millions killed, arbitrarily detained and displaced, in the 
hope that our collective dream of living in a democratic country where all Syrians are 
guaranteed equal rights and freedoms is realised.73 
 This negligence has been felt intimately by many Syrians, and therefore the Ikhwan’s 
appeal to a common experience of suffering serves to reinforce the image of the Syrian 
Ikhwan as the ultimate Syrian advocate.  
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The next commentary was published On September 5th, 2014 when the NATO 
member countries were meeting in Wales and is titled Message to the NATO Summit in 
Wales…Daaʿsh and the Regime are Two Sides of the Same Coin! 74. This piece 
integrates components of both the Daaʿsh-Regime parallel and the condemnation of the 
international community. This piece also incorporates an extended “game” analogy, 
depicting Assad and his allies as maniacal puppet-masters who use tools of diplomacy 
in a game-like manner. 
 Speaking of the rise of global terrorism, they write “The regime bears 
responsibility for its beginning and its end”75, once again portraying Assad as the root 
cause of Daaʿsh. They move on to state:  
“The world continues to recall the Syrian regime's threats which it 
released on the lips of its officials during the start of the Syrian 
revolution, threatening to move the battle to the fields and domains of 
the American and European cities if the free world undertook to support 
the Syrian revolution.” 76 
This appears to be an almost direct reference to an interview between President Assad 
and CBS in 2013—Assad’s first interview since President Obama asked Congress to 
approve a military strike against Syria77. While shirking the blame for the recent use of 
chemical weapons in the conflict, Assad made it clear that the US should expect 
repercussions if they became involved in the conflict. He stated that these repercussion 
may not come directly from the regime, but rather from the myriad of groups and 
factions in the region. When asked about the potential for a retaliation in the form of 
chemical weaponry, he stated: “That depends if the rebels or the terrorists in this region 
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or any other group have it. It could happen. You are going to pay the price if you are not 
wise with dealing with terrorists.”78 The Ikhwan would respond that the regime was in 
fact allied with the terrorist factions, supporting them in their attacks within and beyond 
Syria. 
This discussion of chemical weapons is particularly important as it came just 
nineteen days after the chemical attacks in Ghouta, which claimed upwards of one-
thousand Syrian lives—mostly women and children79. In the aftermath of these attacks, 
the Assad regime and the opposition forces both blamed each other. Following 
assessments made by outside agencies, many international actors blamed the Syrian 
regime, as “the Syrian military is widely believed to have more than 1,000 tonnes of 
chemical agents and precursor chemicals, including several hundreds of tonnes of sarin 
[the chemical agent used in these attacks], as well as the required expertise.”80.  
Although this attack was highly publicized, the response of the international 
community did not inspire hope for the Syrians. On the two year anniversary of the 
attack, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon—“a chemical weapons adviser to NGOs working in 
Syria and Iraq”81, wrote: 
The majority of Syrians I have met in Syria, and out of Syria since the 
Ghouta attack feel abandoned by the international community, and see 
the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad as an equal evil to ISIL, and worse in 
some cases. In some areas of Syria, this helplessness has fuelled support 
for ISIL, who are at least providing them with food and water, albeit 
under a brutal and inhumane regime.82  
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Bretton-Gordon’s comments illustrate once again the value of the Ikhwan’s use of a 
condemnation of the international community in their rhetoric, as it reflects the harsh 
reality which many Syrians have experienced on a daily basis. It further illustrates how 
the violent actions of the regime paired with the neglect of the international community 
have sponsored the growth of Daaʿsh.  
 When speaking specifically of the previously referenced “repercussions” during 
his CBS interview, Assad stated that “It may take different forms, direct and indirect. 
Direct when governments want to retaliate, and indirect when you are going to have 
instability and the spread of terrorism over the region that will influence the west 
directly”83. The Syrian Ikhwan responded to this statement head-on, writing that  
“…in fact, the regime put its threats into practice with the support and 
protection of the first formation of an extremist group in Syrian territory. 
The regime did not make good on implementing its threat by means of 
its own elements or by use of its direct tools. Verily it was apparent that 
the regime had tried to spread terrorism and its practice in Lebanon, Iraq 
and the Arabian Gulf… using that experience in the implementation of 
such a serious threat to save its throne set up by decades of corruption 
and tyranny.”84 
In the second sentence, the Ikhwan call out the Assad regime for its failure to complete 
its threat of using direct retaliation against the West. However, it is evident that the 
Ikhwan consider Assad’s alleged sponsorship of the spread of terrorism to be an equally 
aggressive form of retribution. By once again associating Daaʿsh with the regime, the 
Ikhwan are successfully tarnishing the both entities’ public image.  
The author moves to also utilize a condemnation of the international community 
to further strengthen the image of the Ikhwan as an advocate for the Syrian cause. They 
                                                        
83 Roberts. "Syrian President Assad Threatens 'repercussions' If US Launches Strikes."   





criticize what they call the “hesitant condition” of the international community, stating 
that their failure to prioritize the Syrian crisis will lead to the expansion of a global 
terrorism that will ultimately threaten the security of the West. In the following passage, 
they call on the international community to condemn both Assad and Daaʿsh:  
“Indeed the agony of the massacre of American journalists was felt 
painfully by the Syrians—perhaps more than those other than them 
because it reflect a picture of their daily suffering between the hammer 
of the regime and the anvil of Daaʿsh which has been killing them for 
three and a half years… More dangerous than that, the international 
community continues dealing with the danger of Daaʿsh while ignoring 
the danger of the regime which vowed to move the fight to the European 
and American cities and left to complete its slaughter of the unarmed 
Syrian people.”85 
The “American journalists” referenced here are Steven Sotloff and James Foley, who 
had both been abducted and beheaded by Daaʿsh in late 2014.86 This is the first of a 
series of passages where the Ikhwan reference an act of terrorism which occurred 
outside of Syria in order to thereafter liken it to the daily suffering occurring within 
Syria. This not only offers the opportunity to connect with the many Syrians who have 
felt disregarded by mainstream media, but also depicts the Ikhwan as the spokespeople 
for the Syrians.  
The next passage summarizes an interview with Omar Mushawweh—head of 
the information office for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria— after new elections for 
the Syrian Ikhwan’s Shura council had taken place in November, 2014. These elections 
were a significant step for the group which had been dealing with increasing internal 
                                                        
85 Appendix 2.  
86 Greg Miller. "U.S. Confirms Authenticity of Second Journalist Beheading Video." Washington Post, 







divisions and discontent among the Ikhwan’s ranks. Indeed, Raphael Lefèvre 
commented that these “leadership elections have been seen as a key test of whether the 
Brotherhood can make the changes needed to strengthen the organization and boost its 
role in the country.”87   
This text specifically focuses on the election of the new comptroller general: 
Muhammad Hikimat Walid, “a seventy-year-old UK-educated eye surgeon from 
Latakia”88. The election of a Syrian hailing from Latakia is significant, considering that 
the majority of prominent Syrian Muslim Brothers have originated from Hama and 
Aleppo—the organizations two major power blocs. As discussed previously, these two 
blocs have maintained a longstanding regional rivalry within the Syrian Ikhwan, so the 
election of a general comptroller from neither bloc might be indicative of a desire to 
overcome the cumbersome rivalry.  
This statement reflects the Ikhwan’s desire to assure their present supporters, as 
well as potential future supporters, that they have made the necessary modifications to 
constitute a leading force in the opposition movement. In his statement, Mushawweh 
recognizes some of the realities of the situations: 
 "We need to actually change the reality, and contribute to the progress 
of the revolution, as we will work to restore the strong presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, especially because we have been absent 
from the domestic scene for the past thirty years.”89 
Mushawweh’s recognition of the group’s difficult position is notable, as many public 
statements made by the Syrian Ikhwan will acknowledge their exile status only as an 
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opportunity to reprimand the regime. Throughout this text, Mushawweh not only 
references their exile, but also acknowledges that it has affected their capacity to be 
leaders in the revolution. By recognizing the reality of the situation at a time when 
sectarian division in the group was coming to harm their public image, Mushawweh 
may be helping to reassure an audience which was beginning to doubt the group’s 
leadership capacity. Mushawweh returns to this sentiment again later in the passage 
when he states that “Most certainly we want to restore the role that was played by the 
brotherhood before we were forced out in the eighties”90. This quasi-nostalgic statement 
falls in line with the Ikhwan as Salvation rhetoric, which often highlights the group’s 
lengthy history in Syria. While they were indeed a notable political party is Syria 
preceding their exile, it is fair to say that they were not nearly as prominent as their 
present rhetoric implies. Regardless, they continue to construct a glorious depiction of 
their past in Syria, aiming to portray this fictional history as a symbol of their successes 
to come on the political Syrian scene.  
 Mushawweh concludes with another statement that falls into the scheme of 
Ikhwan as Salvation, stating that “regardless of everything, the Brotherhood is an 
essential part of the equation, and cannot be excluded from any solutions in Syria”91. 
This statement reflects the brotherhood’s long struggle to achieve partnership in the 
revolution. Indeed, the revolution presented the Ikhwan with a “golden opportunity to 
make a historical comeback to the forefront of Syrian politics and society”92. Despite 
their eagerness to insert themselves into Syrian affairs, they faced an uphill battle: 
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forces within Syria, who were well aware of the Ikhwan’s volatile relationship with the 
regime, were consistently apprehensive to collaborate with the Ikhwan for fear of 
attracting harsher retaliation from the regime. Simultaneously, the Ikhwan constituted 
one of the most stable and unified anti-regime organizations, regardless of their internal 
strife.  
As Mushawweh’s comments indicate, the Ikhwan found themselves once again 
struggling to achieve relevance in the Syrian public sphere. To combat this state of 
irrelevance, they continually utilized references to their history and their comparatively 
superior organizational structure to assert that they were a necessary component of any 
resolution.  
The next passage, published on February 4th, 2015, was titled Condemnation of 
the Crime of the Execution of the Jordanian Pilot… and the Responsibility of the 
International Alliance to Correct its Compass93. The phrase “correct its compass” is an 
idiom, which—as one can easily infer—means to correct one’s path, direction or mode 
of operation. The article is commenting on the brutal execution of the Jordanian pilot 
Moaz al-Kasasbeh, who was captured by Daaʿsh is Raqqa, Syria when his plane 
crashed. Daaʿsh posted a horrific video of the execution, as well as a video of Kassabeh 
speaking directly to the Jordanian people, urging them to condemn their government, 
which he calls “an agent of the Zionists”94. Kassabeh is then burned alive in a cage, 
which is subsequently covered is debris and run over by a bulldozer. Following the 
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publication of the video, Daaʿsh circulated Islamic State circulated a “document citing 
Prophet Mohammed on burning apostates alive”95. 
This gruesome video shocked the global community not only because of the 
unprecedented degree of brutality, but also because of its high production quality. A 
large degree of Daaʿsh’s success in recruiting can be attributed to its rapid development 
of a thorough social media presence, which has enabled the organization to connect 
with a global community of disaffected youth.  Indeed, Daaʿsh’s online presence 
constitutes a “paradoxical clash between advanced twenty-first century technology and 
the Jihadi-Salafist interpretation of Islam, which espouses the values of life in the 
seventh century”96. Daaʿsh has actively recruited IT specialists and web developers who 
have helped to develop their brand and create a breadth of online recruitment and 
training resources.97 They frequently post selective quotes from the Quran or hadith to 
justify their actions, which are sufficiently persuasive for youth who have not 
thoroughly studied Islam.  
This is both a terrifying and important reality which the Syrian Ikhwan must 
acknowledge if they intend to present themselves as a formidable Islamist alternative to 
Daaʿsh. Their piece posted in response to the slaughter of the Jordanian pilot reiterates 
the group’s traditional themes of a condemnation of the international community and a 
brief appeal to Islam—neither of which will be sufficient to sway the many youth who 
have been drawn into Daaʿsh’s “digital caliphate”98. 
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The Ikhwan’s passage begins with a condemnation of Daaʿsh’s actions, which 
they state “cannot be accepted by a human who holds moral values or a command of 
religious authority in their life”. This is one of the few appeals to Islam the group has 
made throughout their critiques of Daaʿsh, which could perhaps be because the group 
was apprehensive to attack an organization which they resemble in terms of ideology. 
Indeed, “the Brotherhood groups have a profile of their own that is self-consciously 
quite different in strategy and tactics—though very parallel in ideology and goals—
from the jihadists groups”99. The Brotherhood has from its inception been an 
organization that aimed for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, though many note 
that they have shown “a relative indifference”100 towards this proclaimed goal. This 
indifference has been prominent in the Syrian context, where their recent political 
platforms also include provisions for democracy, protection of minority populations and 
an overall depiction of a modern state. Further, they aim only to enshrine Islam at a 
national—not international—level.  
Regardless, there is naturally a significant overlap in the two organization’s 
potential recruiting pools. Therefore the Ikhwan appeared to tap dance around the topic 
of the Islamic aspects of Daaʿsh in their early comments, condemning their actions 
while simultaneously failing to outright disparage their intentions. It is therefore notable 
that in this instance of a more brutal act of terror, the Ikhwan parted from their previous 
mode of operation and opted to critique Daaʿsh on religious grounds.  
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After the brief condemnation of Daaʿsh’s actions, the group resumes the 
traditional format of their Negligence of the International Community scheme: 
Verily the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria condemns this heinous crime, 
while reminding the whole world that the Syrian regime's crimes against 
his own people have indeed exceeded all red lines, and transgressed all 
moral and humanitarian principles. It is incumbent upon the international 
coalition to address its connection with the first terrorist Syrian regime 
and his myrmidons of criminals and thugs, until it stops the flowing of 
blood on Syrian territory and purifies the region of the atrocities of 
terrorism in all its forms.101 
The author quickly diverts the audiences’ attention back to the suffering of the Syrians 
in order to underscore their role as the mouthpiece of the Syrian people. It 
simultaneously engages the Daaʿsh-Regime parallel, by implying that Assad’s actions 
against his people and the atrocities of Daaʿsh are equal forms of terrorism. This piece 
is unique in that it seems to maintain a quranic reference by its use of the phrase 
“zabaneeah”, translated above as “myrmidons”. It originates from Sura ninety-six, aya 
eighteen. Sura ninety-six discusses how to handle the infidel: 
15. Nay, but if he cease not We will seize him by the forelock (lock of 
hair growing over the forehead)— 
16. The lying sinful forelock— 
17. Then let him call upon his henchmen! 
18. We will call on the guards of hell [myrmidons]. 102 
The translation of “guards as hell” evokes a stronger image by likening the allies of the 
regime to a satanic force. The quranic reference also strengthens the image of the group 
as a religious entity, which is particularly valuable in this context as the passage is 
directly addressing the allegedly Islamic actions of Daaʿsh.   
                                                        
101 Appendix 3 





The Ikhwan take a stronger stance on the issue of terrorism in their next passage 
titled “This Terrorism is Unacceptable in Every Time and Every Place”103, published 
following the 2015 Paris attack. In this strongly worded text, the author evokes each of 
the group’s three predominant rhetorical schemes. This piece seems to indicate that the 
Ikhwan have become more firm in their religious condemnation of Daaʿsh, as they 
contrast their terrorism with the values that the Ikhwan deem to be truly Islamic:  
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria—a group that has always believed and 
discussed and behaved through its deep belief that Islam is characterized 
by tolerance and moderation; the path of justice and equity and the 
defense of all of humanity—strongly condemns this military aggression 
and all action against unarmed defenseless innocent ones, in every time 
and any place. 104 
This is the second instance in which the group so vehemently set themselves apart from 
Daaʿsh on religious grounds. They use this instance not only to condemn Daaʿsh, but 
also to portray themselves as a proper Islamic organization, highlighting all of the 
values which they maintain. While it is impossible to definitively conclude whether or 
not the Ikhwan consider Daaʿsh to be a genuinely Islamist institution, it is evident that 
they have become more comfortable with condemning Daaʿsh on religious grounds.   
 As you may have predicted, this passage utilizes the typical “Negligence of the 
International Community” structure by abruptly moving to discuss the plight of the 
Syrian people:  
At the same time, as we watch the injured France with sadness and pain; 
we remind the world and its forces of all of those with wounds in the 
Syrian cave of deep bleeding— which was struck by the terrorism of 
Assad and his allies the Iranians and the Russians, with all their strength 
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and brutality and oppression; until the death toll became hundreds of 
peaceful innocent Syrians daily.105 
This once again illustrates that the Ikhwan are eager to condemn the international 
community for failing to recognize the atrocities occurring within Syria—a move that 
not only serves as an international call to action but also expresses empathy for the 
millions of Syrians living in diaspora. The Paris attacks, with their considerable amount 
of news coverage, presented the Ikhwan with a unique opportunity to highlight the 
hypocrisy of both the international community and the prominent media sources. After 
expressing their condolences for Paris, they note that the deaths of Syrians have not yet 
warranted “that lengthy media coverage nor indeed heavily armed expressions”106. The 
failure of media to adequately cover the crisis in Syria, they charge, is not only a 
disservice to the Syrian people, but also threatens the safety of the entire global 
community:  
The real threat is of a criminal murderer who declares himself in the 
glory of the day but rather clearly threatens to implement the acts of 
terrorism in the heart of Europe. Verily, the continuing of Bashar and his 
gangs and allies and the Russian intervention…is the real cause of 
terrorism, which exceeded the Syrian border. Indeed, the overthrow of 
Bashar is the only way to eradicate this terrorism.107 
In this quote, the Ikhwan once again reference Assad’s interview with CBS when he 
stated that the US should expect repercussions if they engage in air strikes in Syria. The 
Ikhwan eagerly seized upon this interview as the public confirmation they needed to 
claim that Assad was working in cahoots with Daaʿsh.  
Although it utilized some of the excessively prevalent tactics of Ikhwani 
rhetoric, this commentary is—from an outsider’s perspective— one of the group’s more 
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persuasive pieces. It brings together their three standard rhetorical tools, but in this 
instance grounds them in specific current and historical events. In the concluding 
paragraph, they write:  
Finally, we are pained by the pain of humanity in each place, and we 
hope that the negligent international community feels the great pain 
which the tortured Syrians have suffered for years under the weight of 
Assad and his allies. We hope that it will cooperate with the forces of the 
revolution if it wants to exterminate this terrorism.108 
By likening the pain resulting from the Paris attacks to the pain of the Syrian people, the 
Ikhwan aim to establish a sense of solidarity between the Syrian population and the 
“negligent international community”109. Their linkage of Assad with the crisis in Paris 
would not have been compelling, had they not previously referenced his public 
statement about US repercussions. Their concluding statement—a call for collaboration 
with the international community against the regime and terrorism—is therefore more 
persuasive than it had been previously, as the Paris attacks exemplified the vulnerability 
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Chapter Three: Discussion and Conclusions 
 The present rhetoric of the Ikhwan fails to meet the needs of their target 
audience, and thereby fails to portray them as a viable alternative to Daaʿsh. Some of 
their rhetorical weaknesses were mentioned in the previous chapter, such as a redundant 
argument structure, a reliance on evidentially unsupported claims, and an unpredictable 
and uneven use of religious appeals. Lefèvre asserts that the Ikhwan, aware of the array 
of ideological hurdles in their path forward, hastily crafted their present rhetorical 
strategy110. As was illustrated in the previous chapter, the resulting strategy is 
ambiguous and fails to address the central issues which have placed them in their 
present state of ideological stagnation. Indeed, the “Syrian Muslim Brothers must 
clarify their ideological stance toward a range of issues and disassociate themselves 
more clearly from extremist groups”111—most specifically, they must clarify their 
stance on violence as well as the role of Islam in their desired state. This concluding 
chapter will discuss the three primary causes of this failure to adequately respond to 
Daaʿsh, simultaneously suggesting how the group might craft a better rhetorical 
strategy.  
The first issue which has contributed to the Ikhwan’s failure to respond to 
Daaʿsh is the similarity of the two organizations stated goal: to enshrine Islam at the 
state level. This goal is rooted in the two organizations’ similar ideological legacy, as 
both are labeled as descendants of the Jihadi-Salafi tradition.It is important to note that 
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the Ikhwan are very rarely categorized as Jihadi-Salafi; rather, they are credited for 
championing the notion of the caliphate as the ideal form of Islamic governance. This 
caliphate notion is the centerpiece of Jihadi-Salafi platforms, but it in fact bares little 
contemporary relevance to the political undertakings of the Ikhwan. While foundational 
Ikhwani literature advocates for the establishment of caliphates at the state-level, their 
present political endeavors are far more liberal. Therefore, while this caliphate 
conundrum is likely a source for some of the ideological friction which has caused the 
Ikhwan to respond ambiguously to Daaʿsh, it seems more likely that their apprehension 
results moreso from two groups shared identity as Islamist institutions.  
This issue is linked to the Ikhwan’s seemingly ambiguous relationship to Islam. 
This religious ambiguity has traditionally been characteristic of Islamist institutions; 
indeed, “Islamic constitutional thought is characterized by a remarkable lack of 
specifics”112. Islamist authorities have often stated that Islam supports the utmost form 
of government, without divulging too many details about what form that governments 
may take. In the case of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, this lack of specificity has 
been compounded by the group’s political pragmatism, which—while at times allowing 
them to navigate complex political and social issues—has made some feel that the 
organization is willing to sacrifice religion for political gains.   
The Ikhwan’s seemingly ambiguous relationship to Islam has been exacerbated 
by Daaʿsh’s rise to prominence as this organization relentlessly speaks of their 
dedication to Islam, and it is their central rhetorical tool. Daaʿsh has indeed recognized 
that “The unity between the religious and the political has been, and still is, the stuff of 
                                                        





rhetoric, whether it is put into practice or not”113. The Carter Center has researched the 
religious propaganda at length as a component of their project Countering Daaʿsh (ISIS) 
Recruitment Propaganda through Mobilization of Religious Leaders and Media114. In 
the text below, they summarize the overarching themes of Daaʿsh’s recruitment 
magazine, Dabiq:  
From its initial release, Dabiq has emphasized hijrah (migration), jihad 
(to strive and to struggle—more specifically to “fight” according to 
Daaʿsh) and the importance of the Ummah (community) to attract 
disenfranchised Muslim youth. According to Islamic tradition, when the 
Prophet Muhammed and his followers faced extreme persecution in 
Makkah, God commanded them in a revelation to perform hijrah to 
ensure the preservation of the faith. Daaʿsh capitalizes on the symbolic 
importance of migration that was integral to the founding of Islam and 
coopts this concept drawing a parallel with its own caliphate in 
recruitment materials…Daaʿsh manipulates the meaning of jihad to 
justify its violent actions and build legitimacy within its cohort…[it] 
attempts to link Daaʿsh’s caliphate with the founding of Islam and the 
progression of the early Islamic community—they are suffering the same 
hardships, must migrate, fight to defend themselves to create a just 
society based on Shari’ah.115 
As this passage exemplifies, Daaʿsh’s relationship to Islam is not only more explicitly 
developed than that of the Muslim Brotherhood—it is also a prevalent theme throughout 
all of the group’s publications, as they coopt various interpretations of the Quran of 
hadith to justify their violent tactics.  
The second issue causing the Syrian Ikhwan’s failure in responding to Daaʿsh is 
rooted in their complicated relationship with violence. . It is evident that the Ikhwan 
have what Lefèvre calls a “complex with violence”116, as the issue of violence has been 
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at the center of their most problematic sectarian divisions. This issue was expressed 
throughout the texts analyzed in the previous section, which simultaneously denounced 
Daaʿsh’s violence while calling for the overthrow of Assad and protection of Syrians—
two demands which would necessitate some degree of violence. While they have 
remained for the most part non-violent since the failure of Hama in 1982, they still 
continue to sponsor rebel forces on the ground.  
The Syrian Ikhwan’s inability to fully delineate their stance on violence stands 
in sharp contrast to Daaʿsh, which unapologetically calls for violent jihad. Since the 
outbreak of violence in Syria “… the Brotherhood [has] found its white-collar brand of 
Islamism outflanked by harder-line groups that demanded instant rather than gradual 
application of Islamic law, or rejected democracy as a deviation from God’s commands. 
Among poor, traumatised Sunnis in Iraq and Syria extreme jihadists with guns proved 
to have greater appeal.”117 The issue of violence once again illustrates how the present 
conundrum of the Syrian Ikhwan is based on a few of the group’s fundamental 
shortcomings—shortcomings which become more pronounced when contrasted with the 
steadfast tactics of Daaʿsh.  
The third—and perhaps most cumbersome— issue contributing to the Ikhwan’s 
present state of irrelevance is their failure to bridge and ever-widening generational gap. 
This gap is in part due to the group’s prolonged exile from Syria, but it has been made 
worse by a lack of willingness on the behalf of seniors in the organization to open up 
leadership opportunities to the younger members. The 2014 elections described by 
                                                        






Mushawweh in the previous chapter were a major let down for the younger members of 
the Ikhwan, who had been expecting the election of some younger representatives.  
While there is certainly a need to place younger Ikhwan in positions of 
leadership, the Ikhwan have been making more conscious efforts to engage the youth. 
In December 2012, the Ikhwan hosted a three-day youth conference in Istanbul, where 
350 young Islamists “met, networked, and presented papers on subjects ranging from 
religion to economics to internal reform before discussing these issues in smaller study 
circles.”118 This was a landmark development for the Syrian Ikhwan who needed such 
an event to bolster confidence in their capacity to be leaders in the revolution.  
The results of this conference are indicative of the potential value of increasing 
the amount of youth in the Ikhwan. The younger Ikhwan, who were not raised in the 
context of the Hama v. Aleppo Ikhwani rivalry, are not burdened by that sectarian 
struggle. Further, they are more progressive than their older counterparts and have the 
capacity to overcome the ideological stagnation which has been diminishing the public 
appeal of the Ikhwan. This is exemplified by the youth branch’s adamant advocacy for a 
greater separation between the organization’s political organizing and social endeavors. 
“’To have credibility,’ argued a youth branch leader, an initiative ‘must either be part of 
the parliament or part of the mosque—it should not do both at the same time’”. 119 This 
critique gets to the heart of the Ikhwan’s rhetorical failure to express and vision for the 
role of Islam in the state. While it is impossible to fully determine if such a modification 
would in fact enhance the group’s political stance, this critique indicates the potential 
value of increasing youth representation in the Ikhwan. It appears that the youth may in 
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fact “represent the Muslim Brotherhood’s best chance to counter the argument that the 
organization is out of touch with Syrian society given its thirty-year exile.”120 
Thus, while it is evident that the Syrian Ikhwan have a lot of work to do in order 
to appear as a viable Islamist authority, it seems that they are not necessarily doomed to 
a status of irrelevancy. The flaws of their rhetorical strategy appear to be firmly rooted 
in a need for internal reform and deliberation. Indeed, their redundancy, dependency of 
evidentially unsubstantiated claims and their ambiguous relationship to Islam all are 
likely all results of residual sectarian tensions which could be eased by an influx of 
young leaders. Such an influx would not only aide in the process of ideological 
solidification but would also revamp the group’s public image, bolstering public 
confidence that the Ikhwan are in fact a viable and contemporary Islamist authority.  
Although they experienced a few notable stumbles at the beginning of the Syrian 
conflict, the Ikhwan have since been quite successful in rising up the leadership ranks 
within the Syrian opposition movement. Compared to other prominent opposition 
entities, they have displayed an unprecedented degree of elegance in standing as a 
united front, despite residual sectarian tensions. However, their rhetorical failures are 
strongly indicative of a need for internal reform. If the Ikhwan hope to sustain their 
influence in the Syrian opposition—and ultimately gain political support in a post-
Assad Syria—they first must take an explicit ideological stance on Daaʿsh’s form of 
Islamism, as well as clearly delineating their own stance on the role of Islam in their 
political project. Second, they must take a more explicit and unified stance on 
violence—a stance which, ideally, would help to overcome sectarian tensions within the 
                                                        





organization. Finally, they must bridge the generational gap and place more young 
brothers in positions of leadership—a move which could help the group to overcome 
the issues of religious ideology and violence. While their future as political leaders is 
certainly not doomed, it is evident that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood cannot afford to 
stall on these burgeoning issues if they do hope to upset Daaʿsh’s present status as the 
victor in the battle of rhetorical Islamism.  
 
   
  





























A sect of Shiism which has components of Christianity and Zoroastrianism and 
is highly controversial in the Sunni community, and is particularly despised by 
those of the Salafi ideology. Alawis are a minority in the predominantly Sunni 
Syria and have experienced heavy oppression and discrimination. Alawis are 
strongly represented in the Baʿth party and helped conduct the 1963 coup.  
− Al-Qaʿida 
Meaning in Arabic “the base” or “the foundation”, Al-Qaʿida is the title taken by 
the militant Sunni Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988. 
Similar to other Islamist organizations, it aims to establish an Islamic caliphate 
and pursues this cause in part by carrying out acts of terror.  
− Bashar al-Assad 
The Baʿthist President of Syria who has been in office since the death of his 
father, Hafez al-Assad, in 2000. Bashar al-Assad is Alawi and has often 
attempted to appear devout in order to gain public support. Regardless of these 
attempts, his violent and authoritarian crackdown in response to the 2011 
Arab Spring uprising in Syria have gravely tarnished his reputation in and 
beyond Syria.  
− Baʿth 
The Baʿth party was founded in Iraq and rose to prominence in Syria during the 
wave of nationalism which was bolsetered by the French Mandate period. The 
Baʿth party became increasingly socialist overtime and supported the equitable 
treatment of Syrian minority groups, such as the Alawites. The Baʿth party was 
strongly represented in the Syrian military and have been the ruling party in 






Also known as “ISIS/ISIL”: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ the Levant. The 
anti-Western Sunni terror organization which has become notorious in recent 
years for its utilization of highly publicized acts of brutality. 
− Ikhwan 
“Brothers”, most often referring to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in this text.  
− Islamism 
A movement tailored to resist western social and economic infiltration by 
means of the observation of Islamic laws throughout society, including political 
entities.  Islamists often emphasize the importance of Jihad in this movement, 
though they on what precisely constitutes “jihad”.  
− Jamiʿat 
“Groups”; civil society clubs and organizations that flourished in Syria during 
the mandate period, contributing to the social movement which ultimately 
helped to establish the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.  
− Jihadism 
“Jihad” alone means “to struggle” or “to strive”, and has over time increasingly 
been translated as “to fight”, as in a holy war. Jihadism is the Sunni extremist 
interpretation of jihad; it advocates for the use of violence in the struggle to 
defend Islam. “Jihadism” today is often used interchangeably with “Jihadi-
Salafism”.  
− Salafism 
A doctrine advocating for a return to a fundamentalist practice of Islam. 
Salafism emphasizes the use of ijtihad— rational interpretation of Islamic law.  
In the Syrian context, the Salafiyya movement was used as a means for resisting 
the Western influence of the Ottoman Tanzimat and the French Mandate.   
− Shiʿism  
A shortened version of the phrase “Shiʿat ʿAli” or “followers of ʿAli”; the second 
largest sect of Islam. Shiʿi Muslims maintain the ʿAli was the proper successor 
of the Prophet Muhammed, while Sunni Muslims hold that Abu Bakr was the 





one of their greatest enemies, and have therefore directed much of their 
violence towards Shiʿi Muslims.  
− Shirk  
“Shirk” in Arabic literally means “to share”. In Islam, it means to share as an 
equal partner an idol or another god with Allah; to commit idolatry or 
polytheism.  
− ʿUlamaʾ 
ʿUlamaʾ in Arabic literally means “scholars” or “learned ones”. In the context of 
Islam, it refers to the religious authorities. The ʿulamaʾ in Syria have 
experienced changes in their social status at different times correlating with a 
shift in the value placed on religious knowledge.  
− Umma 
“The community”—in Islam, referring to the global community of Muslims. 
− Zabaneeah 
Translated in this text as “myrmidons”. A reference to the phrase “Sanedʿ al-
Zabaneeah in Sura 96, verse 18 of the Quran, meaning “angels of hell” or 







Appendix 1: Al-Hashemi: Assad Regime Defends “Daaʿsh” 
Valiantly…and the Syrian Revolution Will Come out of This Ordeal 121 
Date of Publication: January 11, 2014 (Gregorian) 10 Rabīʿ Al-Awwal 1435 (Hijri) 
 Syria Brothers Press 
Hassan al- Hashemi, head of the political office of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Syria, said that what occurred today—the move by the Syrian Revolution Brigades to 
remove the organization Daaʿsh from the Syrian scene—was accompanied at the same 
time by a desperate defense by the Assad regime for this escape passageway.  
Al-Hashemi professed in a written statement, that the latest manifestation of this 
blatant contradiction between the position of the revolution and the position of Assad, is 
the recent success of the Syrian Revolution Brigades in the ousting of "Daaʿsh" from 
the city of Dana, the northern province of Idlib. This was followed by aircrafts of the 
regime which bombed the affected area in an attempt to rescue its ally and inflict 
suffering upon the sons and heroes of the revolution. 
Al-Hashemi denounced the international community’s disregard of what is 
happening in Syria, as well as the repetition by some authors and politicians of the lies 
of the criminal regime which markets itself as a warrior of terrorism, while ignoring that 
the Assad regime is one of the bases of terrorism. Terrorism is undertaken today with 
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[the regime’s] support, and it is managed and financed by the help of its masters in Iran 
and Moscow. 
Al-Hashemi stressed that the Syrian revolution is solely concerned with 
rejecting the terrorism which the organization planted in a dust which nothing is able to 
grow in it. And he added “Daaʿsh and the regime continue the wasting of the blood of 
innocent people with a brutality and a savagery which the world has never before seen, 
while the pious sons of the revolution deal with the situation with the morals of Islam. 
The devout Muslim will maintain his focus on concern for the blood of the innocents.  
Al-Hashemi expressed his confidence that the Syrian revolution will emerge 
from this ordeal as it emerged from her other, and "She will be free from the criminal 
traitors who destroyed the country and killed mankind.” 
He concluded by directing a message to the international community which has 
been silent about the heinous crimes of the Assad regime, demanding that they stop 
supporting this murderer of his people, and cease their silence towards his crimes, and 





Appendix 2: Message to the NATO Summit in Wales…Daaʿsh and the 
Regime are Two Sides of the Same Coin!122 
)ijri1435 (H Qaʿdah-Dhū al:  September 5, 2014 (Gregorian) 10 Date of Publication 
In the near past the world watched the criminals of Daaʿsh as they massacred 
American journalists and threatened to slaughter more in a crime against humanity, for 
which the regime of Assad bears responsibility for its beginning and for its end. The 
world continues to recall the Syrian regime's threats which it released on the lips of its 
officials during the start of the Syrian revolution, threatening to move the battle to the 
fields and domains of the American and European cities if the free world undertook to 
support the Syrian revolution. 
On that day the responses of the world varied between disregard and disdain of 
such threats by the regime, but in fact the regime put its threats into practice with the 
support and protection of the first formation of an extremist group in Syrian territory. 
The regime did not make good on implementing its threat by means of its own elements 
or by use of its direct tools. Verily it was apparent that the regime had tried to spread 
terrorism and its practice in Lebanon, Iraq and the Arabian Gulf… using that experience 
in the implementation of such a serious threat to save its throne set up by decades of 
corruption and tyranny. 
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With Iranian support and joint planning, and on its same accustomed way, the 
regime of Assad returned the ball to his square this time, to apply the hand of terrorism 
again…to wreak havoc on earth corruptively and publicize the alleged state. That 
coincided with Iran's implementation of its plan, which aims to achieve significant 
strategic gains through the use of the threads of the game to which they clung in order 
to be accepted as a partner for the international community in the war on terrorism… 
transforming the producers of terrorism into partners in the war against it.  
Indeed, the shrewd Iranian party has achieved many political successes at the 
international level. It was of some strategic importance for Iran: it strengthened itself 
regionally through its signing and appeared as a new moderate partner, in exchange for 
the low prices they paid for their allies, such as Syria’s chemicals and their acceptance 
of the replacement of al-Maliki, as well as some flexibility in minor details in the 
nuclear project. 
With that same skill and political expertise that Iran played the resigning of its 
ally al- Maliki in Iraq, the game continues to be open to many possibilities depending 
on the performance of the international party in the Syrian issue. Meanwhile—when the 
situation requires— Iran preserves the threads of the game with a position to possibly 
improve the circumstances of its negotiation and its directing of the course of events. 
As for the hesitant international condition and the one seeking narrow political 
gains, [the international community] continues to suffer from the condition of chaos in 
the hierarchy of priorities within the big picture of the regional and international 
situation. The repercussions of chaos in the region lead [the international community] to 





which threatens international peace and security. And whose threats reach to all sectors 
of its stable cities. It is required for the international community to not respond to the 
regime’s attempts to achieve partnership in the war on Daaʿsh, rather it is necessary [for 
the international community] to be bent on the importance of pronouncing judgment on 
the regime which threatened and vowed to move the fight to the European and 
American cities, just as [the international community] should strive to condemn Daaʿsh 
which has implemented the threats of the regime of abducting Western civilians and 
killing American journalists in a clear challenge to the whole world. 
Indeed the agony of the massacre of American journalists was felt painfully by 
the Syrians— perhaps more than those other than them because it reflects a picture of 
their daily suffering between the hammer of the regime and the anvil of Daaʿsh which 
has been killing them for three and a half years in front of weakness and ignorance of 
the international community… More dangerous than that, the international community 
continues dealing with the danger of Daaʿsh while ignoring the danger of the regime 
which vowed to move the fight to the European and American cities and left to 
complete its slaughter of the unarmed Syrian people. 
By planning in advance and by the work of an arbitrator, the regime released the 
hand of these criminals across the length and width of the country in order to kill the 
innocent ones and pulverize the country and burn the green and dry lands. Will the 





Appendix 3: Mushawweh: Towards a New Plan for the Muslim 
Brotherhood to Restore its Strong Presence in Syria123 
Date of Publication: November 8, 2014 (Gregorian) 15 Muḥarram 1436 (Hijri) 
Syrian Brothers Press 
Omar Mushawweh, head of the Media Office of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Syria, said that the most prominent task that awaits the new Comptroller General 
Mohammed Hikmat Walid, is arranging a new plan for the brotherhood.  
Mushawweh said in a communication with the site "Arabic Online", "We need 
to actually change the reality, and contribute to the progress of the revolution, as we 
will work to restore the strong presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, especially 
because we have been absent from the domestic scene for the past thirty years.” 
The director of the Office of Media added, "We try to do our work in the 
institutions of the revolution such as the coalition and the National Council in order to 
contribute to raising the level of these institutions, and also open up to other currents on 
the Syrian arena, Most certainly we want to restore the role that was played by the 
brotherhood before we were forced out in the eighties.” 
Mushawweh affirmed that the new leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the cadres will, without the nearest doubt, help Dr. Mohammed Hikmat Walid in his 
duties.  
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And on the possibility of an election of a new overseer of the group, a prelude to 
the possibility of a political solution to the Syrian crisis, Mushawweh said: "Regardless 
of everything, the Brotherhood is an essential part of the equation, and cannot be 






Appendix 4: Condemnation of the Crime of the Execution of the 
Jordanian Pilot…and the Responsibility of the International Alliance to 
Correct its Compass124 
A Media Statement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
Date of Publication: February 4, 2015 (Gregorian) 15 Rabīʿ al-Thānī 1436 (Hijri) 
Indeed the tragic end which Daaʿsh imposed on the Jordanian pilot Mʿuth 
Kassabeh cannot be accepted by a human who holds moral values or command of 
religious authority in their life. . 
Verily the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria condemns this heinous crime, while 
reminding the whole world that the Syrian regime's crimes against his own people have 
indeed exceeded all red lines, and transgressed all moral and humanitarian principles. 
And it is incumbent upon the international coalition to address its connection with the 
first terrorist Syrian regime and his myrmidons of criminals and thugs, until it stops the 
flowing of blood on Syrian territory and purifies it the region of the atrocities of 
terrorism in all its forms. 
 
Media Office 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
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Appendix 5: This Terrorism is Unacceptable in Every Time and Any 
Place 125 
A Media Statement  
Date of Publication: November 14, 2015 (Gregorian) 2 Ṣafar 1437 (Hijri)  
For the second time in one year, a mad killing has struck the capital of France—
Paris –with its viscous stick; positioning hundreds of dead and wounded in an incident 
not seen in France since World War II. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria—a group that has always believed and 
discussed and behaved through its deep belief that its Islam is characterized by 
tolerance and moderation; the path of justice and equity and the defense of all of 
humanity—strongly condemns this military aggression and all action against unarmed 
defenseless innocent ones, in every time and any place. 
At the same time, as we watch the injured France with sadness and pain; we 
remind the world and its forces of all of those with wounds in the Syrian cave of deep 
bleeding— which was struck by the terrorism of Assad and his allies the Iranians and 
the Russians, with all their strength and brutality and oppression; until the death toll 
became hundreds of peaceful innocent Syrians daily—which does not merit that lengthy 
media coverage nor indeed heavily armed expressions. The real threat is of a criminal 
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murderer who declares himself in the glory of the day but rather clearly threatens 
implementing the acts of terrorism in the heart of Europe.  
Verily the continuing of Bashar and gangs and his allies and the Russian 
intervention…is the real cause of terrorism, which exceeded the Syrian border, and 
indeed the overthrow of Bashar is the only way to eradicate this terrorism. 
Finally, we are pained by the pain of humanity in each place, and we hope that 
the negligent international community feels the great pain which the tortured Syrians 
have suffered for years under the weight of Assad and his allies. We hope that it will 
cooperate with the forces of the revolution if it wants to exterminate this terrorism.  
 
Media Office 
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